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ABSTRACT 
Rating agencies have been very active during the economic crisis and have been 
blamed for damaging the refinancing possibilities of the eurozone countries. Their 
decisions concerning sovereign bonds have been widely pointed out as one of the 
reasons why spreads rose dramatically between 2009 and 2012. Nonetheless, last 
evolutions of the sovereign spreads in countries such as Spain, Ireland or France 
show that sovereigns do not respond to rating assessments as extremely as they did 
before. Therefore, economic actors may wonder whether there has been a recent 
change in the trend or by contrast those assessments did not influence the volatility 
of the spreads, which may have been motivated by other variables. In this paper we 
will intend to determine to what extent S&P announcements were drivers of higher 
volatility of sovereign bonds’ spreads and how these effects (if any) have evolved 
over the economic crisis.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The sustainability of public finances has been widely discussed in the framework of 
the eurozone crisis. Since the intensification of the crisis in September 2008, 10-
years sovereign bonds yields increased rapidly, affecting mainly those countries 
whose economic fundamentals were more deteriorated. This impact is clearly 
observed on the widening of these countries’ spreads over German Bunds. Along 
with the increase of the spreads, we observe a sharp rise of the volatility experienced 
by eurozone sovereigns, questioning their consideration as safe investment. 
 
In this context, rating agencies played a significant role. They have been very active 
issuing credit risk announcements, especially in the period 2009-2013. Their 
announcements were accompanied by drastic jumps of sovereign yield spreads (see 
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figure 1). However, the graphs show that the timing of the announcements did not 
always succeed at anticipating the market trends1. 
 
Figure 1:  Evolution of sovereign spreads and S&P rat ing notches2 
    
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
1
 It is worth mentioning that the reduction of sovereign spreads as from mid July 2012, notably in the cases of 
Spain, Ireland, Italy and Portugal and to a lesser extent for Greece, is highly motivated by the announcement 
made by the President of the ECB, Mario Draghi at the Global Investment Conference on the 26th July 2012. In 
this conference Draghi stated that as the stress suffered by the public debt of some eurozone countries is 
hampering the functioning of the eurozone monetary policy, the ECB would adopt the needed measures to make 
it function properly and preserve the euro. 
2
 In order to transform this qualitative data into a numerical format we have followed the approach developed by 
Intereconomics (2011).This analysis of the behaviour of the Credit Rating Agencies (on the right scale) consists 
of 58 points in which changes in outlook and watch have been considered (see appendix 1). This linear 
representation involves that differences of ratings match one to one with different perceptions of sovereign risk. 
Spreads are measured by 10 year government bonds vs German bund. 
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This paper will not contribute to the existent literature on whether Credit Rating 
Agencies provided qualitative assessments or not, but rather on their impact on the 
volatility of eurozone sovereigns spreads. We will intend to determine to what extent 
sovereign rating assessments have been drivers of excessive (“abnormal”) volatility 
of these sovereigns.  
 
Our study links rating agencies, eurozone sovereign debt and spreads volatility. To 
develop this study we have considered the announcements released by the agency 
Standard and Poor´s and the daily yield spreads of 11 eurozone countries  from 
March 2001 to September 2013.  
 
There are several studies that have measured the impact of sovereign ratings on 
sovereign bonds; Cantor and Packer (1996), Larraín et al (1997), Reisen and von 
Maltzan (1998 & 1999), Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) and Raimbourg and Ory 
(2011). In the first three cases they used event study methodologies for a sample in 
which they mainly included emerging countries. They found evidence that rating 
opinions affect spreads and market volatility in certain cases. Ismailescu and Kazemi 
measured the impact of rating news on CDS spreads and they concluded that ratings 
seem to provide new information to the sovereign CDS market. Raisen and von 
Maltzan (1998) measured the impact of rating events on financial market volatility. 
They split volatility into two; bond yield spreads volatility and stock market volatility. 
Using event study methodologies they found that downgrading, reviews for negative 
outlooks and upgrading had statistically significant impact on market volatility.  
 
Our paper brings “fresh air” to the literature related to the topic. Although some of the 
above mentioned papers study the impact of rating assessments on sovereign bonds 
yields in the context of the eurozone crisis, none of them analyze the issue from 
the perspective of spreads volatility. Our first objective is to conduct an event study 
in which we analyze the behavior of sovereign bond volatility, first within an event 
window of 30 days and later within the 4 days surrounding the rating events in order 
to determine whether abnormal volatility is observed. This choice has been motivated 
by the methodology used by Reisen and von Maltzan (1998), Hand et al (1992) and 
Bouraoui (2009). Our second objective is to observe how the influence of rating 
announcements on spreads volatility evolves over the eurozone crisis.  
 
The paper is structured in four sections; second section will be devoted to a literature 
review as well as a description of the trends followed by sovereign bonds volatility 
over the period of analysis. In the third section we will perform an event study that will 
allow us to test both graphically and analytically whether rating announcements 
trigger excessive volatility in the market. We will distinguish between both types of 
announcements; actual rating changes and watch/outlook changes implemented by 
the agency Standard and Poor´s over the period covered by our study. To finalize we 
will draw some conclusions and policy recommendations. 
 
1. RATING ANNOUNCEMENTS AND SOVEREIGN BONDS BEHAVIOUR 
 
1.1 Related literature: impact of rating announcements on spreads 
 
The effects of sovereign rating news on bond risk premium have been widely studied 
by the economic literature. Cantor and Packer (1996) analysed the macroeconomic 
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determinants of sovereign ratings. They found that per capita income, GDP growth, 
inflation, fiscal balance, external debt level and default history are the main factors 
behind the assessments. Additionally, they used an event study to analyse the 
impact of rating news on sovereign spreads finding evidence that rating news affect 
independently market spreads, especially in the case of non-investment grade 
ratings; spreads increase with negative news and viceversa.  
 
Reisen and von Maltzan (1998) associated rating events with changes in sovereign 
spread and financial market volatility. First, they analysed the granger-causality of 
rating news and changes in sovereign spreads. Then, using the same event study 
methodology as Cantor and Packer, they found significant impact of rating decisions 
on sovereign yields which was interpreted as a signal for the market about the credit 
worthiness of the country. In addition, they tested this impact on the volatility of 
sovereign bond spreads3 and stock markets. In both cases they found significant 
impact of negative news on volatility and no impact of positive news.  
 
A similar working paper was published by the OECD in which Reisen and von 
Maltzan (1999) mainly focused on the link between rating agencies decisions and 
emerging countries bond spreads. They concluded that Credit Rating Agencies’ 
opinions tend to foster boom-bust cycles in sovereign bond markets. 
 
Larraín et al (1997) performed an event study to examine the market’s assessment of 
the rating announcements by Moody´s and S&P in the context of the “tequila crisis”. 
They concluded that credit rating opinions tended to lag the market instead of leading 
it because their assessment evidenced that rating events were anticipated by the 
market, especially regarding rating outlook reviews. 
 
More recently Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) tested through an event study 
methodology the reaction of CDS spreads to Credit Rating Agencies’ news. They 
determined that rating announcements seem to provide new information to the 
market. Comparing to the previous literature they found that positive news have a 
more significant impact on sovereign CDS spreads than negative news. They based 
their argument on the fact that negative events have a higher probability of being 
predicted by the CDS market, therefore their impact is lower. In the same line, Kiff et 
al (2012) developed an event study to test whether rating agencies provide new 
information to the sovereign debt market and whether certification services matter. 
They determined that there is a change in sovereign CDS spreads in the expected 
direction that led to a significant widening of the risk premia by about 37 basis points 
on the event day and immediately after the event. 
 
Afonso, Furceri and Gomes (2011) tested the impact of rating announcements on 
CDS spreads and yield spreads for 24 European Union countries. They concluded 
that EMU4 and non-EMU CDS spreads responded similarly to rating news. Positive 
rating news triggered weak and non significant changes in CDS spread, whereas 
negative news increase spreads considerably. Their event study technique only 
found statistically significant market movements on eurozone countries upon 
negative S&P announcements.  
                                                   
3
 Spreads over American 10 year Treasury. 
4
 EMU stands for European Monetary Union. 
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Raimbourg and Ory (2011) developed an empirical investigation of the effect of 
downgrades and negative outlooks on European sovereign bond spreads. They used 
an alternative methodology to measure the significant impact, Perron structural break 
test. They came to the conclusion that the opinions issued by the three leading rating 
agencies are not “harmful” for the market.  
 
Gande and Pasley (2005) tested the impact of rating news on sovereign bond yield 
spreads from a different point of view. They checked the “announcement spillovers” 
that rating agencies news may trigger over the period 1991 - 2000. They include in 
their sample various worldwide countries that issued public debt denominated in 
dollars. They found significant impact of rating events on both affected country 
spreads and other countries’ spreads. One notch downgrade was associated with an 
average increase of 12 basis points of the risk premia of non-downgraded countries.  
 
Regarding news spillovers as well, Arezki et al (2011) analysed this phenomenon in 
the context of the European sovereign debt crisis. They found contagion across 
different countries. CDS spreads from one country may respond to rating events from 
another State. This addressed important regulatory implications about the ability of 
rating agencies to boost financial instability.   
 
Metiu (2011a:7) investigated a question similar to the one of the two previous cited 
documents in the context of the EMU crisis. He showed that “sovereign debt crisis in 
small open economies may become systemically important due to the high degree of 
integration between government bond markets”. He found a significant impact of 
rating news on sovereign yield premia volatility. He captures the asymmetric 
causality effect of rating news on volatility through an ARMA – GARCH model, given 
by the coefficient  and  referred to an estimation of the time varying volatility. 
 
 
 
He determined that an unexpected decrease of spreads raises the volatility of the 
sovereign premia less than an expected increase of spreads. 
More recently, a working paper published by the ECB analyse the impact of 
sovereign bonds assessments performed by rating agencies in the context of the 
eurozone sovereign crisis. De Santis (2012) deals with the impact of rating events on 
the eurozone countries that presented more deteriorated public finances (so-called 
PIIGS5) in the period 2008-2011. He found that country-specific credit rating is one of 
the factors that can explain the developments in sovereign spreads mainly for those 
countries presenting more deteriorated economic fundamentals, although they are 
also influenced by the existence of spillovers from other eurozone countries (i.e. 
Greece). He also finds evidence that spreads for Austria, Finland and the 
Netherlands depend on the higher demand on German bonds during the crisis (flight 
to quality) and not on rating events or lack of liquidity. 
                                                   
5
 Although the acronym PIIGs has been widely stated in the economic literature pointing at the eurozone 
countries (Portugal, Ireland, Spain, Greece) whose public finances were not balanced, it is worth mentioning that 
even if Spain has been included in this group since the beginning of the crisis it is only after Q4 2010 when 
Spanish debt to GDP ratio goes above the limit established by the Stability and Growth Pact, 60%. Spain has 
also been a fully compliant with this Pact in terms of deficit to GDP (3%) and public debt to GDP before the 
beginning of the financial crisis. 
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1.2 Rating announcements as drivers of volatility 
 
In this section we analyse the evolution of sovereign spreads volatility and the factors 
that may link historical volatility with credit rating announcements.   
 
Figure 2: Bond yield spreads volatility (Greece excluded)6 
 
Source: Compiled data from Financial Times. 
 
We observe in figure 2 that up to mid 2007, volatility of eurozone sovereign bonds 
was fairly low. Such a low levels of volatility and the fact that spreads were just few 
basis points above German bund made all eurozone sovereigns be perceived as 
roughly equivalent. However, spreads started widening in mid-2008 and the situation 
worsened as of the beginning of the financial crisis.  
 
Sovereign crisis distorted the perception of investors about credit risk, which was 
reinforced by the increasing trend followed by volatility. In circumstances of low 
volatility, higher yields may compensate for higher risk, and bonds of high-spread 
countries could still be attractive7. But in such a context of high volatility, these 
greater yields are not sufficient to compensate for more risk (IMF, 2011). Since the 
beginning of 2010, volatility of high spread eurozone sovereign bonds was well 
above the level of those countries with low spreads (see figure 3) what had an 
obvious negative impact on their attractiveness; increasing volatility implies that daily 
movements in bond yields (or prices) are less predictable what means greater risk 
from holding these bonds8 (Sosvilla and Morales, 2011).  
 
From a macroeconomic point of view, the increase of uncertainty has a negative 
impact on the economy. First, government debt represents a relevant percentage 
                                                   
6
 Historical volatility computed as 30 days moving average of the change in sovereign debt spread. Volatility 
must be then understood as a measure of the changes in bond yields independently from their sign. 
7
 Appendix 6 a) shows that wider spread are associated with higher spread volatility. 
8
 “An increase in volatility raises the likelihood, for a specific asset/liability, that asset value will fall to the 
default point” (Manning, 2004:13). 
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among the financial assets and higher volatility of sovereign spreads can translate 
into more uncertainty in general expectations. In addition, it also undermines the 
value of the securities issued by local banks and companies due to the fact treasury 
bonds have commonly been considered as a benchmark risk free asset 
(Masciandaro, 2011). Moreover, sovereign bonds are held by banks, companies and 
private investors, mainly national but international as well, so higher bond spread 
volatility has important systemic consequences.  
 
Figure 3 : Eurozone Treasury spreads over German Bunds, and volatility 
 
Source: IMF estimates (2011)   
 
As credit ratings are a measure of the credit capacity (or willingness to pay), we can 
affirm that volatility of yield spreads is potentially influenced by rating announcements 
(Metiu, 2011). A deterioration of the sovereign credit quality causes a reduction of the 
number of potential buyers for these bonds, triggering spread movements and 
difficulties to roll-over debt issuances (Whelan, 2011). 
Financial literature has shown that credit ratings appear to influence sovereign yields 
in addition to their correlation with other publicly available information (Cantor and 
Packer, 1996:349; Reisen von Maltzan, 1999 and Metiu, 2011). Most of the 
announcements made by the Credit Rating Agencies have been concentrated in the 
period 2009-2013. Of course, rating news have not been the only driver of volatility 
since the deterioration of public finances and other news have also played an 
important role. As it was empirically established by Borio and McCuley (1996:75) 
fiscal disequilibria enhance yield volatility, but it is not the only factor; news related to 
sovereign bonds also explain variations.  
 
Certain elements attached to rating assessments may contribute to raise volatility 
upon their announcements. The main channels that we have found in the literature 
are: 
 
a) Attachment of ratings to regulation 
 
Ratings are embedded in regulatory capital and thresholds. Under prudential 
regulation rules, banks are allowed to hold less capital or own reserves against highly 
                                                   
9 In their study, taking into account rating events from Moody´s and S&P they find that their single rating 
variable explains 92% of the variation in spreads.  
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rated securities within their balance sheet10 having to increase its capital in case of 
higher credit risk (lower rating) is assigned to its holdings.  
 
For instance, Basel II rules allowed for two approaches to measure credit risk; the 
standard one that relies on rating assessments by the rating agencies and the 
internal rating based system (IRB). Although banks must have their own 
methodologies to assess credit risk from counterparties or securities, there is a high 
degree of reliance on external assessments (BIS, 2010:52) (Sy, 2009:10).  
  
Other example of attachment of ratings to regulation is the minimum collateral 
requirement of the ECB. The ECB determines through a rating grade scale which 
assets can be used as collateral for money market operations11 (ECB, 2012). 
 
Sometimes, ratings are linked to financial contracts. The application of rating-based 
models is sometimes due to the fact that valuing securities may be tied to ratings 
such as swap protections against downgrading (Duffie and Kenneth, 2003:139). This 
may lead to further collateral calls or force selling by fund managers. In other cases 
the investment mandate of the institution (life insurer, pension funds, etc.) prevents 
managers from investing in securities that are under the eligibility criteria that is often 
set through a rating issued by one of the leading Credit Rating Agencies (Deb et al, 
2011). 
 
Figure 4: Foreign investor share of total sovereign debt. Percentages. 2009-2011. 
 
Source: IMF (2012) 
 
This “hardwiring” of ratings into regulation grants more systemic importance to Credit 
Rating Agencies creating a sort of “license effect” (Masciandro, 2011a). The 
relevance of the rating announcement plays an important role and makes sovereign 
debt yields and prices be sensitive to rating events. In the context of sovereign bonds 
this fact mainly affects to those that are downgrading towards the speculative grade. 
Downgrading may cause sell offs because investors will perceive these bonds as 
distressed. Buy and hold investors will try to rebalance their portfolios in order to 
reduce their exposure and meet the mentioned requirements; price movements will 
                                                   
10
 See appendix 4. 
11
 See appendix 7. 
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also be translated into more capital requirements. This so-called “cliff effect”12 after 
the rating announcement will trigger large price movements and greater yield 
volatility meaning higher market uncertainty. This higher volatility of returns will make 
sovereign bonds less attractive and consequently market risk premia will tend to 
increase (IMF, 2012). This uncertainty led to a “flight for quality” that took place in the 
eurozone during the economic crisis. Foreign banks started reducing their exposure 
to sovereign debt stocks from countries that had been heavily downgrade (Italy, 
Spain, Belgium - figure 4) during 2010 and 2011 (IMF, 2012). 
 
b) Communication effect 
 
The communication policy of the rating announcements can be another driver of 
bond spreads volatility. Although empirical evidence has not been found, the 
importance of communication methods in the release of opinions by Credit Rating 
Agencies has been highlighted by some authors and institutional reports13.  
 
An example of the impact of communication strategies on market behaviour can be 
found in different events such as central bank governor speeches, monthly 
unemployment figures or monthly inflation. The same type of analysis could be done 
for rating agencies news. As stated Masciandro (2011b) these are the main features 
of the communication of rating events: 
• First, the system of symbols (AAA, AA, AA-, etc.) is easy to understand by market 
participants regardless of their level of financial literacy. This fact does not require 
them to go into further analysis when they receive the announcement and market 
actions may be immediate. 
• Rating news are often communicated when markets are open. This may trigger 
instant reactions in the trading venues translated into massive sell-offs which may 
lead to higher market volatility. 
• Despite most of the rating changes are preceded by outlooks or credit watches 
reviews, rating actions are not always foreseen. Since there is not a fixed schedule 
of rating announcements, sovereign rating announcements are not always 
anticipated. Even if they are expected they may trigger greater volatility; especially 
when they are very severe (i.e. downgrades by more than 1 notch14). 
 
2. DATA 
 
2.1 Sovereign ratings 
 
Rating notations are assessments of the ability of the sovereign bond issuer to pay 
back capital and interests. The different notches represent a rating grade, with the 
                                                   
12
 Cliff effect is a concept widely use in the economic literature to refer to the negative effects that a rating 
downgrade has on the cost of funding of the country downgraded. Downgrades trigger sudden actions that may 
impose funding and liquidity difficulties on the country affected. 
13
 See Masciandro (2011a) and EU Commission (2010). 
14
 The economic press has often stated the surprising component of sovereign rating news. Some examples can 
be found in the links below: 
http://www.corriere.it/International/english/articoli/2011/09/20/surprise-downgrade-for-italy.shtml 
http://www.reuters.com/article/video/idUSTRE7B30AO20111206?videoId=226356194 
http://www.iol.co.za/business/international/surprise-at-timing-of-s-p-downgrade-1.1212981 
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lowest grade of default represented by a triple A and speculative grade all notches 
below BB+ (see table 1). 
 
Table  1:  Rat ing  symbols  and qual i t y  o f  sovere ign debt  
 
Source: Cantor and Packer (1996) 
 
Table 2: Rating actions by 3 market competitors (2005-2011) 
 
Source: IMF and Kiff et al (2012) 
 
Figure 5:  Total  number of  sovereigns rated by the market  leaders15 
 
Source: IMF (2010)  
 
                                                   
15
 This figure has been obtained from IMF (2010).  
 
Number of assessments 
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Table 3: S&P Ratings Jan. 2001 and Oct. 2013 
Country Rating S&P Jan -2001 
Rating S&P 
Oct- 2013 
Austria AAA AA+ 
Finland AA+ AAA 
Netherlands AAA AAA 
France AAA AA+ 
Germany AAA AAA 
Belgium AA+ AA 
Spain AA+ BBB- 
Portugal AA BB 
Italy AA BBB 
Greece A- B- 
Ireland AA+ BBB+ 
Source: S&P 
 
Our data related to credit rating assessments come from the rating agency Standard 
and Poor’s (S&P). We have focused on S&P’s assessments due to three reasons: 
First, S&P can be considered as the market leader (table 2 and figure 5) as it is the 
agency that issues the highest number of sovereign ratings and is often the first 
credit agency to take action. Secondly, this agency has a wide availability of rating 
series. Thirdly, it has been widely stated by other authors (Kiff et al, 2012; Reisen 
and von Maltzan, 1999 and Gande and Pasley (2005)) that S&P ratings 
announcements are less often anticipated by the market. 
 
Data related to sovereign rating assessments and outlook changes were provided by 
the agency S&P (appendix 2). We focus on those ratings denominated in local 
currency because debt placements issued by eurozone members are mostly done 
via competitive auctions of long maturity, fixed coupon and domestic denominated 
currency (De Broeck and Guscina, 2011). 
 
2.2 Data set 
 
We cover the following countries in the analysis: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.  
 
The reasons why we have chosen these countries are, first the wide availability of 
data related to these countries from the sources we had access to; secondly, all 
these countries have been members of the eurozone during the whole period of 
study; third, S&P has issued assessments linked to each of these countries during 
the period, at least once (either rating changes or outlook reviews). Moreover all of 
them are considered developed economies and their bonds were rated as 
investment grade at the beginning of the period of study which allows us to set a 
common starting point for our analysis. 
 
The daily data set covers the period between 1 January 2001 and 31 October 2013. 
Since 2001, there have been 80 rating announcements related to these countries 
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issued by S&P (40 downgrades, 12 upgrades, 2 reviews for possible upgrade and 26 
reviews for possible downgrade). 
 
The daily data for sovereign 10 year Government bond yields (end of day) comes 
from Financial Times database. Thus, we have worked with 3,346 observations for 
each country which leads to 36,806 observations. Some transformations have been 
performed in order to make the data workable as explained in the following section. 
We use 10 years government bonds spreads computed as the yield of each country’s 
bond over the German Bund. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
This section is devoted to the analysis of the impact of rating announcements on 
historical volatility of sovereign spreads. This analysis will cover a number of aspects 
such as: 
1. Whether rating announcements lead to “abnormal” spread volatilities; 
 To what extent these announcements are anticipated by the market; 
 Whether abnormal volatility is caused either by positive or negative 
announcements; 
2. Whether the impact of rating assessments on historical volatility varies over the 
crisis. 
 
3.1 Event Study 
 
We use event study method in order to test whether rating agencies announcements 
trigger important shifts in historical volatility of sovereign bond yields. We expect an 
inverse relation between rating changes and increase of the volatility (see appendix 
6). This model is based on the idea that markets react immediately to 
announcements about the credit quality of the bonds (Mac Kinlay, 1997; pp.13). 
Serra (2002) identifies the following stages for the implementation of this 
methodology: 
• Firstly we define our event and the period during which we study the event. For this 
purpose we will test the existence of “abnormal volatility” during the days 
surrounding the event; 30 days before and after the rating announcements.  
• Secondly, we will base our study in the 30 days historical volatility of relative bond 
yield spreads. The method, as used by other authors, usually focuses on abnormal 
excess returns for bonds. Here, we are going to use historical volatility. As bonds 
may display higher risk premia after negative rating news we are going to test how 
this is reflected into volatility. Volatility cannot be directly observed, so it has to be 
calculated. We have measured volatility by using the approach developed by 
Reisen and Von Maltzan (1998) in which they computed historical volatility of the 
relative yield spreads by using a 30-days moving average.  
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Where X is the relative yield spread. We have computed this yield spread taking the 
German Bund as a Benchmark16: 
 
 
 
Following the recommendation by Reisen and von Maltzan (1998:13) we compute 
the relative spread as above. The reason why we use relative spreads is that they 
are more stable and fluctuate less with the general level of interest. 
 
 
 
Third, we determine our estimation and event window (L2). The period of estimation 
(L1) mirrors what it should be considered as “normal” volatility and starts 150 days 
before the event as it is shown in the diagram. During the event window we will 
determine whether there is presence of “abnormal” volatility.  
 
We have also ensured that both windows do not overlap each other in order to avoid 
a deficient estimation.  
 
This model will allows us to test the existence of “abnormal volatility”17 the day of the 
rating announcement and the surrounding days. The existence of a significant 
excess volatility will be considered as a credit event. We will consider abnormal 
volatility as a positive difference between observed volatility on day t and the normal 
volatility. 
 
 
 
Where: = Abnormal volatility on day t; = Volatility observed on day t; = 
Normal volatility estimated. 
 
                                                   
16
 German bund is considered as the less risky Sovereign bond within the EMU. 
17
 The concept of excess volatility or “abnormal” volatility has been used in the financial literature in various 
articles such as Reisen von Maltzan (1998), Bouraoui (2009). 
-30 -150 0 
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Where: 
 
 
This is the average of historical volatility of the 120 days prior to the announcement 
(estimation period)18. This average will serve us to measure our credit event; if 
volatility during the event window is significantly greater than the average of the 
estimation period there will be presence of abnormal volatility otherwise we will 
consider that the volatility is not abnormal.  
 
Then, for each type of announcement19 the event window (-30; 30 days) we will 
produce the contemporaneous reactions to the news by the average of the abnormal 
volatilities. 
 
 
 
 
 is considered as the average of the abnormal volatilities for the different 
events that have taken place within the event windows. The parameter n is equal to 
the number of events of the same nature20 included in the sample. 
 
We compute the cumulative average abnormal volatility over the event window for all 
the announcements treated as a group. 
 
 
 
Finally, the event study will allow us to test whether this estimation is significant 
different from zero. Our null hypothesis will be that rating news does not lead to 
abnormal bond yield volatility. Alternatively, a rejection of the null will mean that the 
announcements made by Standard & Poor´s are associated with excess volatility, 
thus the evolution of the bond yield volatility around the date of the announcement is 
different from its “normal” level. 
 
= Absence of abnormal volatility 
=Presence of abnormal volatility 
 
In order to test our hypothesis we perform a t-test with n-1 degrees of freedom 
following the approach of Holthausen and Leftwich (1992:740): 
 
                                                   
18
 Mackinlay (1997; pp. 15) mentions in his article that an efficient estimation window has to be at least 120 day 
prior to the event and cannot overlap the event window to prevent the event from influencing the normal 
parameters. 
19
 We will distinguish between rating changes and changes in outlook.  
20
 We distinguish between outlook reviews and actual upgrade or downgrade.  
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Where: 
 
 
In order to respect the overlapping condition stated by Mac Kinlay, 1997, we have 
dropped those events (see appendix 5 for details) whose event windows overlapped 
each other. Not removing these events from our analysis would have led to 
misleading results. Moreover events related to Greek bonds after February 2012 
have been dropped from the analysis as well. The reason why we drop them is that 
Greek bonds were downgraded by the agency S&P on 27 February 2012 to selective 
default grade. At that moment the ECB suspended the eligibility of Greek Sovereign 
bonds as collateral in the ECB’s funding operations. Since that date, volatilities of 
Greek bonds attained extreme values, mainly due to the fact that a write off of the 
Greek debt was foreseen by the market. This strong oscillations led to outliers in the 
distribution and strong difficulties to determine whether abnormal volatility was 
caused by rating downgrades or the anticipation of the write off. Thus, we have 
dropped from the distribution rating announcements related to Greek debt as from 
the ECB´s announcement21. 
 
The results of our analysis are shown in table 4 and figure 6 below. 
 
Panels in figure 6 show the changes in the level of volatility. When rating news are 
positive (positive reviews of outlook or upgrades) abnormal volatility is inexistent 
or tends to disappear. Before, during and after the implementation of rating 
upgrades we do observe that average abnormal volatility remains very close to or 
below zero. This is confirmed by the statistical analysis in table 4 where all the tests 
of significance of the cumulative average abnormal volatility reject the existence of 
abnormal volatility. 
 
We observe that the abnormal volatility tends to disappear in the case of reviews for 
possible upgrades. The statistical analysis also confirms the absence of significant 
abnormal volatility. However the lack of a sufficient number of observations of 
positive events does not allow us to draw a conclusion with confidence. 
 
In contrast, we observe the existence of abnormal volatility for negative rating news 
(downgrades and revisions for possible downgrade). As we can observe in table 4, 
we have a greater number of observations for negative events what allows us to 
come to more confident conclusions. Graphs in figure 6 show that there is an 
increase of volatility during the days prior to the implementation of the downgrade. 
                                                   
21
 Please refer to the ECB press release:  
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120228.en.html 
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Average excess volatility reaches 3.5% the day of the event. Excess volatility keeps 
increasing the days after the announcement, this means that the event itself may 
contribute to increase the volatility of bond yield spreads. Although we cannot affirm 
that it is the only factor that drivers excessive volatility during the aftermath of the 
event. We observe on the graph that the level of volatility reaches 10% above its 
normal level 30 days after the event.  
 
Table 4 : Short term impact of rating announcements on spread volatility 
 
OUTLOOK/WATCH 
 
UPGRADE DOWNGRADE  
 
n= No of rating 
announcements 
      
2  21 
      
DAYS 
Cumulative 
average 
abnormal 
volatility 
Std. 
Error 
t-
statistic 
Cumulative 
average 
abnormal 
volatility 
Std. 
Error t-statistic 
-30 to -20 0.47 0.48 0.98 -0.03 0.11 -0.24 
-20 to -11 0.51 0.52 0.98 0.16 0.16 1.03 
-10 to -1 0.43 0.43 0.99 0.32 0.17 1.86* 
0 to 1 0.04 0.03 1.09 0.07 0.04 1.54 
2 to 10 0.02 0.02 0.94 0.32 0.21 1.55 
11 to 20 0.14 0.08 1.74 0.15 0.25 0.61 
20 to 30 0.68 0.62 1.09 -0.02 0.22 -0.09 
 
 
RATING CHANGE 
 
UPGRADE DOWNGRADE  
 
n= No of rating 
announcements 
      
10  24 
      
DAYS 
Cumulative 
average 
abnormal 
volatility 
Std. 
Error 
t-
statistic 
Cumulative 
average 
abnormal 
volatility 
Std. 
Error t-statistic 
-30 to -20 -0.17 0.28 -0.60 0.33 0.18 1.81* 
-20 to -11 -0.15 0.18 -0.83 0.31 0.20 1.55 
-10 to -1 -0.38 0.28 -1.39 0.36 0.23 1.58 
0 to 1 -0.11 0.08 -1.35 0.08 0.05 1.54 
2 to 10 -0.63 0.44 -1.43 0.41 0.24 1.69 
11 to 20 -0.71 0.45 -1.57 0.46 0.29 1.57 
20 to 30 -0.63 0.36 -1.76 0.77 0.38 2.01* 
*Significant 10%, **Significant 5%; ***Significant 1% (n-1 degrees of freedom) 
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Figure 6: Rating events and excess volatility 
58 rating events and sovereign yield spreads22 
   
 
   
 
The statistical analysis shows that the estimation of the cumulative abnormal level of 
volatility is significant different from zero between 20 and 30 days prior to the 
announcement. This means that information from rating agencies is anticipated by 
market players. We also observe that there is a significant level of abnormal volatility 
in the aftermath of the event, meaning that the announcement further contributes to 
market instability. 
 
We observe that the reviews for possible negative ratings may contribute to slightly 
increase the volatility of the bond yield spread, although this abnormal increase tends 
to be anticipated as well but only few days before the event, as it is shown by the 
statistical analysis. Volatility goes up close to 3 % above the normal level of volatility 
the days prior to the announcement of the negative outlook review; nevertheless, it 
goes down again after few trading days.  
 
In order to fully respect the assumption of not overlapping between event windows 
Mackinlay (1997:27), we have performed a new analysis with a shorter event window 
(4 days) that should lead to more accurate results. We have dropped from the 
analysis all these events of the same nature whose event windows overlapped (see 
appendix 5). Moreover, as stated above, events related to Greek bonds announced 
in 2012 have been removed as well. We have ended up with 34 rating downgrades, 
                                                   
22
 We have actually accounted 47 events during the period 2/1/2001 – 30/11/2011 but Portugal was downgraded 
twice in the same week 24th March 2011 and 29th March 2011, so we have only considered the second date for 
our study to avoid distortions from accounting twice the same event. Greek downgrade, 13th June 2011, has been 
excluded for the same reason. See press release: 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704471904576230532021525182.html 
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10 upgrades, 2 reviews for possible upgrades and 23 reviews for possible 
downgrade. We have changed our estimation window; from 150 days to 4 days 
before the event and the event window as it is shown on the graph below: 
 
 
 
The t-test now shows that abnormal volatility is statistically significant on the event 
day. The increase of the estimation period leads to a more accurate estimation of 
normal volatility being the reason why we obtain a higher significance level. This 
excess volatility is also confirmed by the graphical analysis. 
 
Table 5 : Short term impact of rating announcements on spread volatility 
 
OUTLOOK/WATCH 
 
Upgrade Downgrades 
 
 
No of rating 
announcements 
      
6  23 
      
DAYS 
Cumulative 
average 
abnormal 
volatility 
Std. 
Error 
t-
statistic 
Cumulative 
average 
abnormal 
volatility 
Std. 
Error 
t- 
statistic 
-4 to -1 -0.07 0.067 -1.08 0.08 0.076 1.109 
0 to 1 -0.06 0.052 -1.17 0.04 0.043 0.975 
2 to 4 -0.09 0.087 -1.08 0.07 0.067 1.019 
 
RATING CHANGE 
 
Upgrade Downgrades  
 
No of rating 
announcements 
      
10  34 
      
DAYS 
Cumulativ
e average 
abnormal 
volatility 
Std. 
Error t-statistic 
Cumulativ
e average 
abnormal 
volatility 
Std. 
Error 
t- 
statistic 
-4 to -1 -0.16 0.126 -1.301 0.12 0.067 1.822* 
0 to 1 -0.10 0.077 -1.297 0.08 0.038 2.008* 
2 to 4 -0.18 0.130 -1.366 0.13 0.065 2.003* 
*Significant 10%, **Significant 5%; ***Significant 1% (n-1 degrees of freedom) 
 
-4 -150 0 4 
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Regarding reviews for possible downgrade, abnormal volatility is not significant at 
any reasonable level of confidence neither the event date nor during the aftermath. 
Positive news do not lead to abnormal volatility either. 
 
This event study presents some limitations, first we have worked with a small 
sample, and further research in this direction should use a larger sample. Moreover, 
a comparison between the different market reactions upon other agencies 
announcements such a Fitch or Moody´s would have also been valuable in order to 
compare the effect of different agencies’ assessments23.  
 
Due to these reasons our conclusions must be cautioned. 
 
Figure 7: Rating events and excess volatility. 
69 observations for reviews for possible downgrades and actual downgrades 
   
   
 
3.2 Univariate regression 
 
Finally we have performed an univariate regression of volatility on rating categories 
for each year between 2010 and 201324. The outcome is showed in table 6.  
 
Here rather than looking at the coefficients, we want to observe the evolution of the 
significance of ratings on volatility. Interestingly, the level of significance is lower 
after 2010 as it is shown by the t-statistic. This indicates a higher influence of ratings 
on volatility of relative yield spreads in 2010, however, it seems that the influence of 
                                                   
23
 Please refer to Appendix 8 for details regarding the histogram of our estimation. 
24
 For the variable rating number, we have used the rating equivalent transformation available in appendix 1. We 
have included volatilities of all the countries in our sample. The method of regression is OLS, so from this table 
the reader should not take into account the coefficients attached to the variable since we are not trying to 
measure the impact of one variable on the other and the regression may be affected by some statistical flaws. We 
are just interested in showing how the level of significance varies.  
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other factors different from rating assessments is higher in the subsequent years. 
This confirms what we observed graphically for each event separately (see appendix 
3). The volatility tends to increase drastically during the surrounding dates of the 
rating downgrades in 2010 and to less extent in 2011. This is consistent with Veron 
and Wolff (2011:60) who pointed that especially “after the Deauville G-20 declaration 
in October 2010 market developments appeared to be “driven” more by political 
pronouncements and less by ratings decisions”. The higher significance of ratings in 
2010 could also be explained by the sharp multi-notch downgradings imposed on 
Portugal and Greece in April 2010 pushing them to the frontier of speculative debt or 
even beyond.  
 
Table 6 : Univariate regression of relative spread volatility on rating categories25. 
Dependent variable: Relative spread volatility 
 
Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic R2 
 
  
 
 
2010 
  
 
 
Intercept 0.683 0.0074 91.32 0.71 
Rating -0.011 0.000145 -79.88  
 
  
 
 
2011 
  
 
 
Intercept 1.27 0.019 66.41 0.55 
Rating -0.022 0.000395 -56.55  
 
  
 
 
2012 
  
 
 
Intercept 2.24 0.0286 78.12 0.617 
Rating -0.042 0.0006 -64.90  
 
  
 
 
2013 
  
 
 
Intercept 0.943 0.013 69.33 0.58 
Rating -0.017 0.003 -55.17  
 
  
 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
We have tested to what extent rating announcements lead to abnormal volatility 
during the days surrounding the rating event and whether the impact of these events 
have been equally significant in the different periods of the last economic crisis. 
 
Our main results show that downgradings lead to abnormal volatility before and after 
the event. This means that rating assessments lag the market and investors take 
action before sovereign rating announcements. Furthermore, once we reduce the 
event window, we also obtain statistically significance of abnormal volatility on the 
event day. This may be due to two factors, even if rating assessments are 
anticipated, market players wait for rating agencies’ announcements before 
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reallocating their assets and the hardwiring of ratings to regulation. Moreover, ECB 
collateral requirements may lead to sell-offs of those sovereigns that are downgraded 
or pushed near or beyond speculative investment grade.  
 
Our univariate regression shows that as from 2011 the influence of rating events on 
sovereign bonds spreads instability lowers, and the influence of other factors, 
different from rating events, on spreads movements is higher, which is consistent 
with the analysis of other authors such as Veron et al 2011. This may be an example 
of previous overreliance on rating assessments that may have contributed to the 
boom and boost (i.e. excessive volatility) in eurozone sovereign bond spreads over 
the crisis. 
 
Financial authorities may consider solutions on how to counterbalance reliance on 
rating agencies assessments and internal modelling. It is well-known that the latter 
may lead to some conflict of interests, however the former lack from accuracy what 
may lead to higher volatility in the market. 
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Appendix 1: Rating equivalent transformation 
 
S&P Watch changes S&P Rating - outlook Rating equivalent transformation 
 AAA 58 
AA+ watch pos AAA neg 57 
AAA watch neg AA+ pos 56 
 AA+ 55 
 AA+ neg 54 
AA+ watch neg AA pos 53 
 AA 52 
AA- watch pos AA neg 51 
AA watch neg AA- pos 50 
 AA- 49 
A+ watch pos AA- neg 48 
AA- watch neg A+ pos 47 
 A+ 46 
A watch pos A+ neg 45 
A+ watch neg A pos 44 
 A 43 
A- watch pos A neg 42 
A watch neg A- pos 41 
 A- 40 
BBB+ watch pos A- neg 39 
A- watch neg BBB+ pos 38 
 BBB+ 37 
BBB watch pos BBB+ neg 36 
BBB+ watch neg BBB pos 35 
 BBB 34 
BBB- watch pos BBB neg 33 
BBB watch neg BBB- pos 32 
 BBB- 31 
BB+ watch pos BBB- neg 30 
BBB- watch neg BB+ pos 29 
 BB+ 28 
BB watch pos BB+ neg 27 
BB+ watch neg BB pos 26 
 BB 25 
BB- watch pos BB neg 24 
BB watch neg BB- pos 23 
 BB- 22 
B+ watch pos BB- neg 21 
BB- watch neg B+ pos 20 
 B+ 19 
B watch pos B+ neg 18 
B+ watch neg B pos 17 
 B 16 
B-watch pos B neg 15 
B watch neg B- pos 14 
 B- 13 
CCC+ watch pos B- neg 12 
B- watch neg CCC+ pos 11 
 CCC+ 10 
CCC watch pos CCC+ neg 9 
CCC+ watch neg CCC pos 8 
 CCC 7 
CCC- watch pos CCC neg 6 
CCC watch neg CCC- pos 5 
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 CCC- 4 
CC watch pos CCC- neg 3 
CCC- watch neg CC pos 2 
 CC 1 
C watch pos CC neg 0 
 
 
Appendix 2: S&P Rating announcements 
 
S&P rating news 
Country Dates Type of 
news 
 Country Dates Type of news 
France 05/12/2011 Negative 
outlook  Italy 05/12/2011 
Negative 
outlook 
France 13/01/2013 Downgrade  Italy 13/01/2012 Downgrade 
Belgium 15/12/2010 Negative 
outlook  Italy 09/07/2013 Downgrade 
Belgium 28/11/2011 Downgrade  Portugal 29/10/2004 Negative 
outlook 
Belgium 05/12/2011 Negative 
outlook  Portugal 27/07/2005 Downgrade 
Belgium 13/01/2012 Upgrade  Portugal 13/01/2009 Negative 
outlook 
Netherlands 05/12/2011 Negative 
outlook  Portugal 21/01/2009 Downgrade 
Netherlands 13/01/2012 Downgrade  Portugal 07/12/2009 Negative 
outlook 
Austria 05/12/2011 Negative 
outlook  Portugal 27/04/2010 Downgrade 
Austria 13/01/2012 Downgrade  Portugal 30/11/2010 Negative 
outlook 
Austria 29/01/2013 Upgrade  Portugal 24/03/2011 Downgrade 
Finland 04/02/2002 Upgrade  Portugal 29/03/2011 Downgrade 
Finland 05/12/2011 Negative 
outlook  Portugal 05/12/2011 Downgrade 
Finland 13/01/2012 Downgrade  Portugal 13/01/2012 Downgrade 
Finland 14/01/2013 Upgrade  Portugal 06/03/2013 Upgrade 
Ireland 04/10/2001 Upgrade  Portugal 05/07/2013 Negative 
outlook 
Ireland 09/01/2009 Negative 
outlook  Portugal 18/09/2013 
Negative 
outlook 
Ireland 30/03/2009 Downgrade  Greece 10/06/2003 Upgrade 
Ireland 08/06/2009 Downgrade  Greece 13/09/2004 Negative 
outlook 
Ireland 24/08/2010 Downgrade  Greece 17/11/2004 Downgrade 
Ireland 23/11/2010 Downgrade  Greece 09/01/2009 Negative 
outlook 
Ireland 02/02/2011 Downgrade  Greece 14/01/2009 Downgrade 
Ireland 01/04/2011 Downgrade  Greece 07/12/2009 Negative 
outlook 
Ireland 05/12/2011 Negative 
outlook  Greece 16/12/2009 Downgrade 
Ireland 13/01/2012 Downgrade  Greece 16/03/2010 Positive outlook 
Ireland 11/02/2013 Upgrade  Greece 27/04/2010 Downgrade 
Ireland 12/07/2013 Upgrade  Greece 02/12/2010 Negative 
outlook 
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Spain 30/07/2003 Positive 
outlook  Greece 29/03/2011 
Negative 
outlook 
Spain 13/12/2004 Upgrade  Greece 09/05/2011 Negative 
outlook 
Spain 12/01/2009 Negative 
outlook  Greece 13/06/2011 Downgrade 
Spain 19/01/2009 Downgrade  Greece 27/07/2011 Downgrade 
Spain 09/12/2009 Negative 
outlook  
Greece 27/02/2012 Downgrade / default 
Greece 02/05/2012 Upgrade 
Spain 28/04/2010 Downgrade  Greece 07/08/2012 Downgrade 
Spain 13/10/2011 Downgrade  Greece 05/12/2012 Downgrade / default 
Spain 05/12/2011 Downgrade  Greece 18/12/2012 Upgrade 
Spain 13/01/2012 Downgrade     
Spain 24/04/2012 Downgrade     
Spain 10/10/2012 Downgrade     
Italy 15/01/2003 Negative 
outlook     
Italy 07/07/2004 Downgrade  
Italy 08/08/2005 Negative 
outlook  
Italy 19/10/2006 Downgrade  
Italy 20/05/2011 Negative 
outlook  
Italy 20/09/2011 Downgrade  
Source: S&P (2012) "Sovereign Rating and Country T&C Assessment Histories".  
 
 
Appendix 3: Volatility Portuguese bonds (2008-2011) 
 
To illustrate this paragraph we have plot the analysis for Portugal although this trend 
has also been observed in other countries of the sample affected by rating changes. 
 
Rating events and volatility Portugal between 2008 and 2011. 
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Volatility during the 60 days (30 days before and after) surrounding the rating event. 
Downgrades 
 
21/01/2009   27/04/2010   24/03/2011 
   
 
Outlook changes 
 
13/01/2009   07/12/2009   30/11/2010 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4: Basel rating requirements and rating categories. 
 
Basel II Sovereign Credit Weights 
 
 
Source: BIS 
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Credit categories by rating agency 
 
Source: IMF. 
 
 
Appendix 5: Events dropped to avoid overlapping 
 
30 days event window 
Date Country Type of event 
13/01/2013 France Downgrade 
05/12/2011 Belgium Negative outlook 
13/01/2012 Netherlands Downgrade 
13/01/2012 Austria Downgrade 
13/01/2012 Finland Downgrade 
09/01/2009 Ireland Negative outlook 
13/01/2012 Ireland Downgrade 
19/01/2009 Spain Downgrade 
13/01/2012 Spain Downgrade 
13/01/2012 Italy Downgrade 
13/01/2009 Portugal Negative outlook 
29/03/2011 Portugal Downgrade 
13/01/2012 Portugal Downgrade 
14/01/2009 Greece Downgrade 
16/12/2009 Greece Downgrade 
27/04/2010 Greece Downgrade 
29/03/2011 Greece Negative outlook 
27/02/2012 Greece Default grade 
05/12/2012 Greece Default grade 
18/12/2012 Greece Upgrade 
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4 days event window 
Date Country Type of event 
05/12/2011 Belgium Negative outlook 
19/01/2009 Spain Downgrade 
13/01/2009 Portugal Negative outlook 
29/03/2011 Portugal Downgrade 
14/01/2009 Greece Downgrade 
16/12/2009 Greece Downgrade 
27/02/2012 Greece Default grade 
05/12/2012 Greece Default grade 
 
 
Appendix 6 
 
Relationship Volatility – Spreads (2001-2013). 
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Appendix 7: List of credit assessment sources accepted by the Eurosystem. 
 
 
Source: ECB 
 
 
Source: ECB 
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Appendix 8: Estimated “abnormal volatility”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
